Stephanie Leary
Associate Professor
Stephanie Leary聽did her聽B.A. in philosophy聽at the University of Washington聽from 2006-2009 and her聽PhD at聽Rutgers University聽from 2010-2016. Before coming to McGill, she was the Oscar R. Ewing Visiting Assistant Professor at Indiana University, Bloomington.聽聽
Most of Stephanie鈥檚 research is about whether normative properties like goodness, badness, rightness and wrongness are ultimately reducible to the stuff of science (and what that means), and whether ethical considerations, and not just evidence, are relevant to what we ought to believe (and how so).
She is currently the Principal Investigator of a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) funded research project, A Metaphysics First Approach to Metaethics (Insight Grant 2025-2030).
For more information, visit her personal website:
鈥淣on-naturalism without Contingentism鈥� (with Chris Howard) forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.))
鈥淭he Applied Moral Turn of the Ethics of Belief Debate,鈥� forthcoming in Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles (Routledge), Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford, & Matthias Steup (eds.)
鈥淢oral Encroachment and #BelieveWomen,鈥� forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology
鈥淓pistemic Reasons for Action: a Puzzle for Pragmatists,鈥� (2022) Synthese 200: 248
鈥淲hat is Non-naturalism?鈥� (2022) Ergo 8(52). doi
鈥淏anks, Bosses, and Bears: a Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment,鈥� (2021) Philosophyand Phenomenological Research 105(3): 657-676.
鈥淕rounding the Domains of Reasons鈥� (2020) Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98(1): 137-52.
鈥淚n Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief鈥� (2017) Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(3): 529-42.
鈥淣on-naturalism and Normative Necessities鈥� (2017) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 12: 76-105.