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UID:20250513T112525EDT-5766DWaAuz@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20250513T152525Z
DESCRIPTION:Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar\n\n \n\nSpeaker: Maria C
 armela Ceparano – Università Degli Studi Di Napoli Federico II\, Italy\n\n
 \n\nAbstract: The study on how equilibria behave when perturbations occur 
 in the data of a game is a fundamental theme\, since actions and payoffs o
 f the players may be affected by uncertainty or trembles. In this presenta
 tion we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the subgame perfect Nash eq
 uilibrium (SPNE) and of the SPNE outcomes in one-leader one-follower Stack
 elberg games under perturbations both of the action sets and of the payoff
  functions. The investigation allows also to define selection methods for 
 SPNEs that can accommodate various behaviors of the players. More precisel
 y\, we show that perturbations relying on a Tikhonov regularization\, on a
 n adverse-to-move behaviour and on an altruistic behaviour can produce spe
 cific selection results associated to such perturbations.\n\n(with Frances
 co Caruso and Jacqueline Morgan)\n
DTSTART:20230216T160000Z
DTEND:20230216T170000Z
LOCATION:CA\, ZOOM
SUMMARY:Asymptotic Behavior and Selection of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibri
 a in Stackelberg Games
URL:/cim/channels/event/asymptotic-behavior-and-select
 ion-subgame-perfect-nash-equilibria-stackelberg-games-351773
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